Robert Wilson

Robert Wilson

The Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, Stanford Graduate School of Business

Research by Category

Research

Books

Nonlinear Pricing

New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. ISBN 0-19-506885-8. Paperback edition 1997.

Reviewed by Richard Schmalensee, Journal of Political Economy, December 1994, 102(6): 1288-1291 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138788); and by John C. Panzar, Journal of Economic Literature, September 1995, 33(3): 1339-1341. Selected by the editors of the Journal of Business as the 1995 winner of the Leo Melamed Prize, awarded biannually by the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago for “outstanding scholarship by a business professor.” 

Economic Theory

“Efficient Intertemporal Allocation of Risk and Return”

co-authored with Eiichiro Kazumori. Available as Research Paper 2055, July 2010. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1639613.

Exchange

Entry for The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, S. Durlauf and L. Blume (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008. (Revision of entry in 1st edition, see below.) Appears in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. 

Strategic Models of Entry Deterrence

in: R. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 1, Chapter 10, pp. 305-329, 1992. Amsterdam: NorthHolland/Elsevier Science Publishers. doi:10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80013-X

Entry and Exit

in: George R. Feiwel (ed.), The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment, 1989, Chapter 8, pp. 260-304. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. [Google Books]

Deterrence in Oligopolistic Competition

in: Paul C. Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis, and Roy Radner (eds.), Perspectives on Deterrence, 1989, Chapter 8, pp. 157-190. New York: Oxford University Press. [Google Books]

Efficient and Competitive Rationing

Econometrica, Volume 57, No. 1 (January 1989), pp. 1-40. Reprinted in Ray Rees (ed.), The Economics of Public Utilities, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., London, 2006.

Credentials and Wage Discrimination

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, special issue on Information and Incentives in Organizations, Volume 90, No. 4 (December 1988), pp. 549-562.

Exchange

Entry in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.), Volume 2, pp. 202-207. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987. Reprinted in The New Palgrave Selected Reprints, Volume 2 (Allocation, Information, and Markets), 1989, pp. 83-93; The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, 1992; and The New Palgrave World of Economics, 1992. Revised version appears in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, S. Durlauf and L. Blume (eds.), Macmillan Press Ltd., 2008 (cited above). [Google Books]

Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture

co-authored with Faruk Gül and Hugo Sonnenschein, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39 (July 1986), pp. 155-190. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4 Reprinted in: Peter B. Linhart, Roy Radner, and Mark A. Satterthwaite (eds.), Bargaining with Incomplete Information, Chapter 12, pp. 264-299, Academic Press, San Diego, 1992. PDF

Efficient Trading

in: Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, George Feiwel (ed.), Chapter 4, pp. 169-208. London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1985. (Reviewed by J. Chilton in The Wall Street Review of Books, Fall 1986, pp. 236-238.) [Google Books]

 

Multi-Dimensional Signaling

Economics Letters, Vol. 19, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 17-21. doi:10.1016/0165-1765(85)90094-1

Auditing: Perspectives from Multi-Person Decision Theory

The Accounting Review, Vol. 58, No. 2 (April 1983), pp. 305-318.

Competitive Nonlinear Tariffs

co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 1983) pp. 49-71. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90122-9

Risk Measurement of Public Projects

in: Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy, R. C. Lind (ed.), pp. 205-249. Washington: Resources for the Future and John Hopkins University Press, 1982. [Google Books]

Computation of Competitive Equilibria by a Sequence of Linear Programs

coauthored with Alan Manne and Hung-Po Chao, Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 7 (November 1980), pp. 1595-1615. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911924

Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy

Econometrica, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July 1978), pp. 807-816. Reprinted in: D. Glycopantis and N. Yannelis (eds.),
Differential Information Economies, pp. 55-64, Springer-Verlag, New York, ISBN 3-540-21424-0. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1909750

Competitive Exchange

Econometrica, Vol. 46, No. 3 (May 1978), pp. 577-585. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1914233

Informational Economies of Scale

Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 1975), pp. 184-195. Reprinted in G. Heal (ed.), The Economies of Increasing Returns, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1999. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3003221

On the Theory of the Firm in an Economy with Incomplete Markets

co-authored with Steinar Ekern, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1974), pp. 171-180. Reprinted as Chapter 10 in: M. McGill and M. Quinzii (eds.), Incomplete Markets, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 2008, ISBN 978 1 84542 862 4. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3003097

The Structure of Trade

co-authored with Mordecai Kurz, Economic Inquiry, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 1974), pp. 493-516.

Optimal Dividend Policy

Proc. Fourth International Conference on Operations Research, D. Hertz and J. Melese (eds.), John Wiley & Sons, New York (1968), pp. 128-138.

Decision Analysis in a Corporation

IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, Vol. SSC-4, No. 3 (September 1968), pp. 220-226.

The Theory of Syndicates

Econometrica, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January, 1968), pp. 119-132. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1909607

A Pareto-Optimal Dividend Policy

Management Science, Vol. 13, No. 9 (May 1967), pp. 756-764. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2628092

Exchange Equilibrium as a Budgetary Adjustment Process

International Economic Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (February 1967), pp. 103-108. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2525386

Game Theory

Foundations

Stringent Criteria for Rational Strategic Behavior

Text of lecture at award of the JeanJacques Laffont Prize, November 2010, Toulouse.

Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games

coauthored with Srihari Govindan, Econometrica, Volume 80, Number 4 (July 2012), 1639–1699. Available as Research Paper 2021, May 2011, and at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1418183. DOI: 10.3982/ECTA9579

On Forward Induction

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Econometrica, Volume 77, Number 1 (January, 2009), pp. 1–28. Available as Research Report 1986 and at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095469 . DOI: 10.3982/ECTA6956

Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Two Players, Perfect Information, and Generic Payoffs

co-authored with Srihari Govindan. Available as Research Paper 2008, February 2009, and at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345371

Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Generic Payoffs

co-authored with Srihari Govindan. Available as Research Paper 2000, September 2008, and at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287385

Nash Equilibrium, refinements of

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, entry for The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, S. Durlauf and L. Blume (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008. (Available as Research Report 1897, June 2005. http://ssrn.com/abstract=772081http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/dictionary
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230226203.1155

Metastable Equilibria

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Mathematics of Operations Research, Volume 33, Number 4 (November 2008), pp. 787-820. Available as
Research Paper 1934R and at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=900612 and in Articles in Advance, November 3, 2008. 

Stable Outcomes of Generic Extensive-Form Games

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, December 2004; revised May 2007. Available as Research Paper 1933R and at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=900185.

Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Theoretical Economics, Volume 1, Number 2 (June 2006), pp. 167–206. http://econtheory.org/ (Available as Research Report 1896, “Justification of Stable Equilibria,” Stanford Business School, June 2005. http://ssrn.com/abstract=757885 )

Essential Equilibria

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, Volume 102, Number 43 (October 25, 2005), pp. 15706-15711. http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/102/43/15706http://www.jstor.org/stable/4143499 http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JPROC.2005.857491 (Revision of “Characterization of Hyperstability,” March 2004; available as Research Report 1900, June 2005. http://ssrn.com/abstract=772084)

“Introduction to the Special Issue in Memory of Robert W. Rosenthal

co-authored with Andrew Postlewaite, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 45, No. 2 (November 2003), pp. 271–277. doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00174-X

Maximal Stable Sets of Two-Player Games

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2002), pp. 557-566. doi:10.1007/s001820200098

“Invariance of Stable Equilibria of Signaling Games”

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Festshrift in Honor of Steinar Ekern, 2002. Bergen, Norway: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.

Structure Theorems for Game Trees

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, Vol. 99, No. 13 (2002), pp. 9077-9080. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3059143.

Direct Proofs of Generic Finiteness of Nash Equilibrium Payoffs

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 3 (May 2001), pp. 765 – 769. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692209

“Admissibility and Stability”

in: Wulf Albers, Werner Guth, Peter Hammerstein, Benny Moldovanu, and Eric van Damme (eds.), Understanding Strategic Behavior: Essays in
Honor of Reinhard Selten, Chapter 8, pp. 85-99, 1997. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Uniqueness of the Index for Nash Equilibria of Two-Player Games

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Economic Theory, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Fall 1997), pp. 541–549. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25055058

Equivalence and Invariance of the Index and Degree of Nash Equilibria

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 21, No. 1 (October-November 1997), pp. 56–61. doi:10.1006/game.1997.0516

“A Sufficient Condition for Invariance of Essential Components”

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Duke Mathematical Journal, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 39-46.

Nonlinear Pricing and Mechanism Design

in Hans Amman, David Kendrick, and John Rust (eds.), Handbook of Computational Economics, Volume 1, Chapter 5, pp. 253-
293, 1996. New York: Elsevier Science Publishers. ISBN 10: 0-444-89857-3, ISBN 13: 978-0-444-89857-9

John Harsanyi and the Economics of Information

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 14, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 296-298. doi:10.1006/game.1996.0054

Reputations in Games and Markets

in: Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining with Incomplete Information, Alvin Roth (ed.); Chapter 3, pp. 27-62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. (Reviewed by S. Clark in Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1987, page 103.) [Google Books]

Reputation and Imperfect Information

co-authored with David Kreps, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 1982), pp. 253-279. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 Reprinted in: Oliver Williamson (eds.), Industrial Organization, 1990 (paperback edition 1996); London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Also in: Jean Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse (eds.), Microeconomic Theories of Imperfect Competition: Old Problems and New Perspectives, 1998; London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Jill J. McCluskey and Jason Winfree (eds.), The Economics of Reputation, 2017, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma

co-authored with David Kreps, Paul Milgrom, and John Roberts, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 1982), pp. 245-252. Reprinted in: A. Rubinstein (ed.), Game Theory, 1991; London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1

Sequential Equilibria

co-authored with David Kreps, Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 1982), pp. 863-894. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912767

“Perfect Equilibria and Sequential Rationality”

in: Games of Incomplete Information and Related Topics, H. Moulin et al. (eds.). Marseilles-Luminy, France: Centre International de Rencontres Mathematiques, 1981.

Auctions and Bidding

Existence of Equilibria in All-Pay Auctions

co-authored with Srihari Govindan. Available as Research Paper 2058, July 2010, and at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1650291 . Submitted to Econometrica.

Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Two Symmetric Bidders

co-authored with Srihari Govindan. Available as Research Paper 2057, July 2010, and at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1639615 .

Existence of Equilibria in Private-Value Auctions

co-authored with Srihari Govindan. Available as Research Paper 2056, July 2010, and at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1639599

Design of Efficient Trading Procedures

in: Daniel Friedman and John Rust (eds.), The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, 1993. Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Proceedings Volume XIV, Chapter 5, pp. 125-152. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Strategic Analysis of Auctions

in: R. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory, 1992, Volume 1, Chapter 8, pp. 227-279. Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier Science Publishers. doi:10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80011-6

Equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets

in: Arrow and the Ascent of Economic Theory: Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow, G. Feiwel (ed.); Chapter 11, pp. 375-414. London and New York: Macmillan Press and New York University Press, 1987.

Game-Theoretic Analyses of Trading Processes

in: Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Truman Bewley (ed.); Chapter 2, pp. 33-70. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987; reprinted in, Recent Developments in the Economic Theory of Incentives, David Martimort (ed.), 2017.

“Bidding”

entry on auction theory, in: The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.), Volume 1, pp. 238-242. London: Macmillan
Press Ltd., 1987. Reprinted in: The New Palgrave Selected Reprints, Volume 2 (Allocation, Information, and Markets), 1989, pp. 54-63; and The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, 1992. [Google Books]

Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions

Econometrica, Vol. 53, No. 5 (September 1985), pp. 1101-1116. Reprinted in: P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1999. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911013

On Competitive Bidding Applied

Chapter IV.4 in: Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting: Uses and Theory, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Martin Shubik, and Robert M. Stark
(eds.), pp. 363-368. New York: New York University Press, 1983. ISBN 0814778275, 9780814778272. [Google Books]

Auctions of Shares

Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 93, No. 4 (November 1979), pp. 675-689. Reprinted in: P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1999. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1884475

A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition

Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (October 1977), pp. 511-518. Reprinted in: P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of
Auctions, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1999. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2296904

Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information

Management Science, Vol. 15, No. 7 (March 1969), pp. 446-448. Reprinted in: Steven A. Lippman and David K. Levine (eds.), The Economics of Information, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1994; and P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1999. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2628640

“Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information”

Management Science, Vol. 13, No. 11 (July 1967), pp. 816-820. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2628622

Bargaining and Negotiation

A Bargaining Model of Monetary Nonneutrality

Economie publique/Public Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2005), pp. 161-171. ISSN 1373-496. http://economiepublique.revues.org/2529

A Theory of Discovery in Litigation

co-authored with Robert Mnookin, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 25, No. 2 (November 1998), pp. 219 – 250.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/1073173 doi:10.1006/game.1997.0632

Private Information and Legal Bargaining

entry in Peter Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics, 1998. New York: Grove’s Dictionaries.

“Negotiation with Private Information: Litigation and Strikes”

in D. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and M. Kamien (eds.), Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory: The Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lectures 1983-1997, Econometric Society Monograph Series, 1998; pp.160–182. New York: Cambridge University Press. [Also published by Northwestern University in 1996 as a booklet.] [Google Books]

“Signaling in Negotiations”

in: Richard Zeckhauser, Ralph Keeney, and James Sebenius (eds.), Wise Choices: Games, Decisions, and Negotiations, 1996, Chapter 22, pp. 400-413. Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press. [Google Books]

“Strategic and Informational Barriers to Negotiation”

Chapter 6, pp. 108-119, in: K. Arrow, R. Mnookin, L. Ross, A. Tversky, and R. Wilson (eds.), Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 1995. New York: W.W. Norton & Company [reissued in 2000 by the Harvard Program on Negotiation]. [Google Books]

Bargaining with Private Information

co-authored with John Kennan, Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 31, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 45-104. Reprinted in A. Booth (ed.), The Economics of Labor Unions, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2001. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2728150

Theories of Bargaining Delays

co-authored with John Kennan, Science, Vol. 249 (7 September 1990), pp. 1124-1128. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2878034

Can Strategic Bargaining Models Explain Collective Bargaining Data?

co-authored with John Kennan, American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 2 (May 1990), pp. 405-409. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006609

Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data

co-authored with John Kennan, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Supplement, Vol. 4 (Autumn 1989), pp. S87-S130. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2096595

Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco

coauthored with Robert H. Mnookin, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (March 1989),
pp. 295-334. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1073173

Models of Elections

Competition for a Majority

co-authored with Paulo Barelli and Srihari Govindan, Econometrica, Volume 82, Number 1 (January 2014), 271-314. Available as Research Report 2104, June 2012 (revised April 2013), or at SSRN, Abstract 2088534. DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11008

Computation

A Decomposition Algorithm for N-Player Games

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Economic Theory, Volume 42, Number 1 (January 2010), pp. 97–117. Available as Research Report 1967 and at SRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007569  doi:10.1007/s00199-009-0434-4 

Global Newton Method for Stochastic Games,

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 44, Number 1 (January 2009), pp. 414–421. Available as Research Paper 1985 and at SSRN: http:/ssrn.com/abstract=1095446 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.002

Supply Function Equilibrium in a Constrained Transmission System

Operations Research, Volume 56, Number 2 (March-April 2008), pp. 369-382. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0421. (Early version available as Chapter 3 of  Implementation of Resource Adequacy Requirements via Option Contracts,” Report 1010712, Electric Power Research Institute, October 2005; and revised version as Research Report 1966, Stanford Business School, and at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=998614 )

Computing Equilibria of N-Player Games with Arbitrary Accuracy,”

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, February 2008. Available as Research Paper 1984 and at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1111767 .

Computing Nash Equilibria by Iterated Polymatrix Approximation,”

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 28, No. 7 (April 2004), pp. 1229-1241. doi:10.1016/S0165-1889(03)00108-8

“A Global Newton Method to Compute Nash Equilibria”

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 110, No. 1 (2003), pp. 65-86. doi:10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00005-X . https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002205310300005X

Computing Simply Stable Equilibria

Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 5 (September 1992), pp. 1039-1070. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951538

“Computing Equilibria of Two-Person Games from the Extensive Form

Management Science, Vol. 18, No. 7 (March 1972), pp. 448-460. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2629364

Computing Equilibria of N-Person Games

SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (July 1971), pp. 80-87. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2099844

Market Design and Pricing

*Includes selected reports.

Coordination of electricity transmission and generation investments

co-authored with Hung-po Chao , Volume  86, 2020,  Energy Economics.

“Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton’s Ekati Diamonds”

co-authored with Peter Cramton and Samuel Dinkin, chapter 12, pp. 299-322, in The Handbook of Market Design, Oxford University Press (2013), N. Vulkan, A. Roth, Z. Neeman (eds.). ISBN 978-0-19-957051-5. [Google Books]

Applicant Auctions for Internet Top-Level Domains: Resolving Conflicts Efficiently

coauthored with Peter Cramton, Ulrich Gall, and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta, November 2012.

“Electric Power Pricing”

chapter 4 in Handbook of Pricing Management, Ozalp Ozer and Robert Phillips (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 93-98. ISBN13: 9780199543175, ISBN10: 0199543178 [Able Books]

“Economic Analyses of Distributional Impacts of Transmission Projects”

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, New England Independent System Operator and Proceedings of the Western Conference of the Center for Regulatory Economics, June 2012.

Restructured Electricity Markets: Reëvaluation of Vertical Integration and Unbundling

co-authored with Hung-po Chao and Shmuel Oren, chapter 1, pp. 27-64 in: Competitive Electricity Markets: Design, Implementation, Performance, F. P. Sioshansi (ed.),
Elsevier, New York, 2008. ISBN 978-0-08-047172-3. Reviewed by David Newbery in the Energy Journal, 2008.

Alternative Pathway to Electricity Market Reform: A Risk-Management Approach

coauthored with Hung-po Chao, Shmuel Oren, Proceedings of the IEEE, Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS-39), abstracted in IEEE Computer Society 2006, ISBN 0-7695-2507-5.

Interface between Engineering and Market Operations in Restructured Electricity Systems

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, Shmuel Oren, Alex Papalexopoulos, and Dejan Sobajic, Proceedings of the IEEE, special issue on “Electric Power Systems:
Engineering and Policy,” Volume 93, Number 11 (November 2005), pp. 1984-1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JPROC.2005.857491

“Electricity Market Transformation: A Risk Management Approach”

co-authored with Hung-po Chao and Shmuel Oren, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, Report 1008549, April 2005.

“Integrated Engineering and Economic Operation of Power Systems”

co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Alex Papalexopoulos, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, Report 1009483, January 2004.

“Resource Adequacy and Market Power Mitigation via Option Contracts”

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, July 2003. Chapter 1 of “Implementation of Resource Adequacy Requirements via Option Contracts,” Report 1010712, Electric Power Research Institute, October 2005.

Multi-Dimensional Procurement Auctions for Power Reserves: Robust Incentive-Compatible Evaluation and Settlement Rules

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (September 2002), pp. 161-183.

Activity Rules for an Iterative Double Auction

chapter 12, pp. 371-386, in K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson (eds.), Game Theory and Business Applications, 2001. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press. [Google Books]

Flow-based Transmission Rights and Congestion Management

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, Stephen Peck, and Shmuel Oren, Electricity Journal, October 2000, pp. 38 – 58. doi:10.1016/S1040-6190(00)00146-9

“Foreword”

in H. Singh (ed.), Game Theory Applications in Electric Power Markets, 1999. Piscataway NJ: IEEE Power Engineering Society. [Google Books]

“Design Principles,”

chapter 11 in H. Chao and H. Huntington (eds.), Design of Restructured Power Markets, 1998. Norwell MA: Kluwer Academic Press.

“Pricing Issues”

chapter 6 in H. Chao and H. Huntington (eds.), Design of Restructured Power Markets, 1998. Norwell MA: Kluwer Academic Press.

“Implementation of Priority Insurance in Power Exchange Markets

Energy Journal, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 111-123.

“Introduction”

co-authored with John McMillan and Michael Rothschild, Special Issue on Market Design and the Spectrum Auctions, Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Fall 1997), pp. 425–430.

Using Auctions to Divest Generation Assets”

co-authored with Peter Cramton and Lisa Cameron, Electricity Journal, Vol. 10, No. 10 (November-December 1997), pp. 22–31.

Priority Service Methods

in H. Chao, S. Oren, and S. Smith (eds.), New Service Opportunities for Electric Utilities: Creating Differentiated Products, 1993, Chapter 2, pp. 7-29. Norwell MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Option Value of Emission Allowances

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 233-249.

Multiproduct Tariffs

Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 5-26; and “Erratum,” Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 1991), p. 211. DOI: 10.1007/BF00157608

“Optimal Contract Period for Priority Service

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, Operations Research, Vol. 37, No. 4 (July-August 1990), pp. 598-606. http://www.jstor.org/stable/171077

“Service Design in the Electric Power Industry”

co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith. (Author of Chapters 1-8 and 14-19.) Report P-6543, January 1990. Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute.

Ramsey Pricing of Priority Service

Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 1989), pp. 189-202. DOI: 10.1007/BF00134956

“Competitive Strategies in Business”

Norwegian Economic Journal, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Autumn 1989), pp. 241-251.

“Priority Service: Market Structure and Competition”

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, Shmuel Oren, and Stephen Smith, Energy Journal, special Issue on Electricity Reliability, Volume 9, No. 4, November 1988, pp. 77-104.

“Priority Service: Pricing, Investment, and Market Organization”

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, American Economic Review, Volume 77, No. 5, December 1987, pp. 899-916. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1810216

“Multi-Product Pricing for Electric Power”

co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Energy Economics, Vol. 9 (April 1987), pp. 104-114. doi:10.1016/0140-9883(87)90013-2

“Selected Papers on Priority Service”

co-authored with Shmuel Oren, Stephen Smith, and Hung-po Chao. Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute, Report EPRI P-5350, August 1987; 253 pages.

“Multi-Level Demand-Subscription Pricing for Electric Power”

co-authored with Hungpo Chao, Shmuel Oren, and Stephen Smith, Energy Economics, Vol. 8 (October 1986), pp. 199-217. doi:10.1016/0140-9883(86)90001-0

“Priority Service: Unbundling the Quality Attributes of Electric Power”

co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith. Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute, Report EA-4851, November 1986.

“Priority Service: Managing Risk by Unbundling Electric Power Service”

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, Shmuel Oren, and Stephen Smith, Proceedings of Energy Technology Conference XIII, March 1986, pp. 1610-1618.

“Capacity Pricing”

co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Econometrica, Vol. 53, No. 3 (May 1985), pp. 549-566. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911654

“Pricing a Product Line”

co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Journal of Business, Vol. 57, No. 1 [Part 2, supplement] (January 1984), pp. S79-S99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2352925

“Nonlinear Pricing in Markets with Interdependent Demand”

co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Marketing Science, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 287-313. http://www.jstor.org/stable/183930

“Linear Tariffs with Quality Discrimination”

co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Autumn 1982), pp. 455-471. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3003466

“Management and Financing of Exploration for Offshore Oil and Gas”

Public Policy, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Fall 1978), pp. 629-657.

Social Choice Theory

Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 5, No. 3 (December 1972), pp. 478-486. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90051-8

A Note on Revelation of Information for Joint Production,”

Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1984), pp. 69-73

On the Theory of Aggregation,”

Vol. 10 (February 1975), pp. 89-99

The postulates of game theory,”

co-authored with Stefan Bloomfield, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Vol. 2 (1972), pp. 221-234

“Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle,”

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 5, No. 3 (December 1972), pp. 478-486. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90051-8

“The game-theoretic structure of Arrow’s general possibility theorem,”

Social Choice, B. Lieberman (ed.), pp. 393-407. London and New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1971. linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0022053172901159

“Stable Coalition Proposals in Majority-Rule Voting,”

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1971), pp. 254-271. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(71)90022-6

The Finer Structure of Revealed Preference,”

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1970), pp. 348-353. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(70)90018-9

“Arrow’s Possibility Theorem for Vote Trading,”

Mathematical Theory of Committees and Elections, pp. 26-39. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, 1969.

An Axiomatic Model of Logrolling,”

American Economic Review, Vol. 59, No. 3 (June 1969), pp. 331-341

“The Role of Uncertainty and the Value of Logrolling in Collective Choice Processes,”

La Decision: Agregation et Dynamique des Ordres de Preference, G. Guilbaud (ed.), pp. 309-315. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1969

“The Structure of Incentives for Decentralization under Uncertainty,”

La Decision: Agregation et Dynamique des Ordres de Preference, G. Guilbaud (ed.), pp. 287-307. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1969.

Optimization

“On the Need for a System Optimization Laboratory,”

co-authored with G. B. Dantzig, et al., Mathematical Programming, T. C. Hu and S. M. Robinson (eds.), pp. 1-32. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Appears also as G. B. Dantzig, R. W. Cottle, B. C. Eaves, F. S. Hillier, A. S. Manne, G. H. Golub, D. J. Wilde, and R. B. Wilson (1974), On the need for a Systems Optimization Laboratory, pp. 3-22 in Optimization Methods for 15 Resource Allocation (Proc. NATO Conf., Elsinore, 1971), R. W. Cottle and J. Krarup (Eds.), English Universities Press, London. stanford.edu/group/SOL/classics.html

Integer Programming via Modular Representations,”

Management Science, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 1970), pp. 348-353. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2628519

“Investment Analysis under Uncertainty,”

Management Science, Vol. 15, No. 12 (August 1969), pp. B650-B664. Reprinted in Stochastic Optimization Models in Finance, W. Ziemba and R. Vickson (eds.), Academic Press, 1975; republished by World Scientific Publishing, 2006, ISBN 981-256-800-X. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2628428

Stronger Cuts in Gomory’s All-Integer Integer Programming Algorithm,”

Note, Operations Research, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January, 1967), pp. 155-157. http://www.jstor.org/stable/168521

Computation of Optimal Controls,”

Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1966), pp. 77-82.

“On Programming under Uncertainty,”

Operations Research, Vol. 14, No. 4 (JulyAugust 1966), pp. 652-657. http://www.jstor.org/stable/168728

Programming Variable Factors,”

Management Science, Vol. 13 (September 1966), pp. 144-151. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2627918

A Simplicial Algorithm for Concave Programming,”

Boston: Harvard Business School, 1963. Dissertation. 

Editor

Barriers to Conflict Resolution,”

New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995. ISBN 0-393- 03737-1. Co-edited with K. Arrow, R. Mnookin, L. Ross, and A. Tversky. Paperback edition published in 2000 by the Harvard Program on Negotiation, Cambridge, MA. Reviewed by Robert Cooter, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 34, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 1953-1955 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/2729607).

Co-winner of the 1995 Awards for Excellence Book Prize of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution.

“Special Issue on Auction Design,”

co-edited with John McMillan and Michael Rothschild, Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1997.

“Special Issue in Honor of Robert W. Rosenthal,”

co-edited with Andrew Postlewaite, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 45, No. 2 (November 2003). doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00174-X 

Book Reviews

Game and Economic Theory: Selected Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann,”

University of Michigan Press, 1995; reviewed in Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 21 (1997), pp. 322-324. doi:10.1006/game.1997.0593

“Charles Christenson, Strategic Aspects of Competitive Bidding for Corporate Securities,”

Harvard Business School Press; reviewed in Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 62, No. 318 (June 1967), pp. 695-697. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2284000

“Daniel Teichroew, An Introduction to Management Science: Deterministic Models,”

reviewed in Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 60, No. 311 (September 1965), pp. 932-933. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2283265

Selected Unpublished Papers

“Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection in Outside-Option Games and and “Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection in Perfect-Information Games”

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, March 2003.

“Hierarchical Pricing of Transmission,”

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, Shmuel Oren, and Stephen Peck, May 2001.

“Uniqueness of the Index for Nash Equilibria of Finite Games”

co-authored with Srihari Govindan, July 1998; revised July 1999.

“Design of Wholesale Electricity Markets,”

book manuscript co-authored with Hung-po Chao, 1999.

“Efficiency Considerations in Designing Electricity Markets,”

report to the Competition Bureau of Industry Canada, March 1998.

“Auction Design for Standard Offer Service,”

co-authored with Peter Cramton and Andrew Parece, September 1997.

“Activity Rules for the Power Exchange,” and “Priority Pricing of Ancillary Services,”

reports to the California PX and ISO Trusts for Power Industry Restructuring, March and May, 1997.

  • www.market-design.com/files/wilson-activity-rules-for-a-power-exchange.pdf
  • www.market-design.com/files/wilson-activity-rules-for-a-power-exchange-experiments.pdf

“Auctions of Stranded Power Assets,”

May 1996 (LEES Working Paper, School of Engineering, MIT), and “Auctions of Transmission Capacity Reservations,” November 1996, filings to the Massachusetts DPU and Attorney General, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

“Multi-Unit Auctions,”

co-authored with Hung-po Chao, November 1995.