us capitol
The U.S. Capitol

Current Projects

  • A framework for interpreting procedural change in collective-choice institutions
  • It’s about time: a theory of optimal obstruction in legislatures  (with Christian Fong)
  • When should informal rules be codified? (with Steve Callander)

Limited Obstruction (with Chistian Fong) American Political Science Review, 112, no.1 (February 2018) 1-14.

Majoritarianism, Majoritarian Tension, and the Reed Revolution. (with Alan Gerber and Eric Schickler, eds. Governing in a Polarized Age: Essays on Elections, Parties and Representation in Honor of David Mayhew (2015 or 1016 forthcoming)

Legislative Organization and Ideal-Point Bias (with Zachary Peskowitz) Journal of Theoretical Politics, 27, no.4 (2015)

A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking (with Adam Meirowitz and Alan Wiseman) Political Science Research & Methods 3 (September 2015): 423-48.

Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World (with Steven Callander) American Journal of Political Science 58 (October 2014): 819-34.

Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game.  American Journal of Political Science, 51 (April 2007): 231-40.

Partisan Roll Rates in a Nonpartisan Legislature. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 27 (Spring 2007): 1-23.

Gatekeeping. (with Christophe Crombez and Tim Groseclose) Journal of Politics, 68 (May 2006): 322-34.

PivotsOxford Handbook of Political Economy. Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds. New York: Oxford University Press.  2006: 223-40.

Macro Politics and Micro Models: Cartels and Pivots ReconsideredThe Macro Politics of Congress, E. Scott Adler and John Lapinski, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  2006: 21-49.

Joe Cannon and the Minority Party: Tyranny or Bipartisanship? (with Alan Wiseman). Legislative Studies Quarterly, 30 (2005): 497-505.

Parties in the Electorate, Parties in Government, and Partisan Bias (with Adam Meirowitz and Thomas Romer).  Political Analysis, 13 (2005): 113-38.

Testing Theories of Lawmaking (with Adam Meirowitz and Jonathan Woon). In Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks, eds. David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, Berlin: Springer (pp. 249-268, 2005).

Legislative OrganizationJournal of Economic Perspectives, 18 (2004): 113-28.

Boxing Methods in Legislative StudiesThe Evolution of Political Knowledge: Theory and Inquiry in American Politics.  Edward Mansfield and Richard Sisson, eds. Columbus Ohio: Ohio State University Press. 2004: 195-99.

Institutionalism as a Methodology (with Daniel Diermeier). Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15 (2003): 123-44.

The Coefficient of Party InfluencePolitical Analysis, 11 (2003): 96-104.

Asymmetry in Party Influence: Reply. Political Analysis, 11 (2003): 109-10.

Minority Rights and Majority Power: Theoretical Consequences of the Motion to Recommit (with Adam Meirowitz). Legislative Studies Quarterly, 27 (2002): 191-218.

Here’s the President, Where’s the Party? U.S. Appropriations on Discretionary Domestic Spending, 1950-1999 (with Rod Kiewiet, in Japanese). Leviathan, 30 (2002): 115-37, 2001.

Joseph G. Cannon: Majoritarian from Illinois (with Alan Wiseman). Legislative Studies Quarterly, 26 (2001): 357-389.

Plausibility of Signals by Heterogeneous CommitteesAmerican Political Science Review, 95 (2001): 453-8.

Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship. American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000): 212-27.

The Party Effect from A to Z and BeyondJournal of Politics, 61 (1999): 832-40.

Paradoxes of Parties in Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999): 31-64.

Pivotal Politics: A Refinement of Nonmarket Analysis for Voting InstitutionsBusiness and Politics, 1 (1999): 63:81.

Specialization Decisions within Committee (with Thomas Gilligan). Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 13 (1997): 366-86.

Restrictive Rules Reconsidered. American Journal of Political Science, 41(1997): 919-44.

Rejoinder to “Sense and Sensability”American Journal of Political Science, 1 (1997): 958-64.

Dynamics of Cosponsorship (with Daniel Kessler). American Political Science Review, 90 (1996): 1-12.

Committee Power, Leadership, and the Median Voter: Evidence from the Smoking Ban. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 12 (1996): 234-56.

Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified GovernmentJournal of Theoretical Politics, 8 (1996): 7-40.

Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to ZAmerican Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995): 906-23.

The Gains from Exchange Hypothesis of Legislative Organization (with Thomas Gilligan). Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19: (1994) 181-214.

Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102nd Congress. (with Timothy Groseclose). American Journal of Political Science, 38: 75-99 (1994).

Deference, Extremism, and Interest Group RatingsLegislative Studies Quarterly, 19: 61-78 (1994).

Where’s the Party? British Journal of Political Science, 23: (1993) 235-66.

The Pervasiveness of Sophisticated Sincerity (with Timothy Groseclose). Political Economy: Institutions, Information, Competition and Representation. W. Barnett, M. Hinich, H. Rosenthal, and N.Schofield, eds., New York: Cambridge University Press, (1993) 247-78.

Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences. Public Choice, 76: (1993) 21-37.

Seniority, Commitment, and Self-Governing GroupsJournal of Law Economics and Organization, 6: (1990) 73-77.

Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers? American Political Science Review, 84 (1990): 149-63.

Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature. (with Thomas Gilligan), American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990): 531-64.

Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration. (with Douglas Rivers), Journal of Politics, 52 (1990): 548-78.

Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee. (with Thomas Gilligan), American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989): 459-90.

Collective Choice without Procedural Commitment. (with Thomas Gilligan). Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, Peter C. Ordeshook, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1989).

A Rationale for Restrictive Rules. Home Style and Washington Work, Morris P. Fiorina and David W. Rohde, eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1989).

The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage. (with Douglas Rivers), American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988): 1151-74.

Spatial Models of Legislative Choice. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 8 (1988): 259-319.

Complex Rules and Congressional Outcomes: An Event Study of Energy Tax Legislation. (with Thomas Gilligan) Journal of Politics 50 (1988): 625-54.

Why Are Congressional Committees Powerful? American Political Science Review, 81 (1987): 929-35.

Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures. (with Thomas Gilligan) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (1987): 287-335.

The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget. (with John Ferejohn) American Journal of Political Science, 31 (1987): 296-320.

Sophisticated Committees and Structure-Induced Equilibria in Congress. Congress: Structure and Policy. Mathew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press (1987).

Sophisticated and Myopic Behavior in Legislative Committees: An Experimental StudyAmerican Journal of Political Science 30 (1986): 542-61.

Unanimous Consent Agreements: Going Along in the SenateJournal of Politics, 48 (1986): 306-329.

A Technique for Estimating Congressmen’s Ideal PointsJournal of Politics, 48 (1986): 97-115.

Obstruction and Representativeness in Legislatures. American Journal of Political Science,  29 (1985): 643-59.

The Quality of Survey Responses about Parents and Families: A Longitudinal Analysis. (with Richard Niemi), Political Methodology, 10 (1984): 193-209.

The Incumbency Advantage in Congressional Elections: A Test of Two Explanations. (with John Wright), American Journal of Political Science, 27 (1983): 140-57.