- A framework for interpreting procedural change in collective-choice institutions
- It’s about time: a theory of optimal obstruction in legislatures (with Christian Fong)
- When should informal rules be codified? (with Steve Callander)
Limited Obstruction (with Chistian Fong) American Political Science Review, 112, no.1 (February 2018) 1-14.
Majoritarianism, Majoritarian Tension, and the Reed Revolution. (with Alan Gerber and Eric Schickler, eds. Governing in a Polarized Age: Essays on Elections, Parties and Representation in Honor of David Mayhew (2015 or 1016 forthcoming)
Legislative Organization and Ideal-Point Bias (with Zachary Peskowitz) Journal of Theoretical Politics, 27, no.4 (2015)
A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking (with Adam Meirowitz and Alan Wiseman) Political Science Research & Methods 3 (September 2015): 423-48.
Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World (with Steven Callander) American Journal of Political Science 58 (October 2014): 819-34.
Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game. American Journal of Political Science, 51 (April 2007): 231-40.
Partisan Roll Rates in a Nonpartisan Legislature. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 27 (Spring 2007): 1-23.
Gatekeeping. (with Christophe Crombez and Tim Groseclose) Journal of Politics, 68 (May 2006): 322-34.
Pivots. Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006: 223-40.
Macro Politics and Micro Models: Cartels and Pivots Reconsidered. The Macro Politics of Congress, E. Scott Adler and John Lapinski, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2006: 21-49.
Joe Cannon and the Minority Party: Tyranny or Bipartisanship? (with Alan Wiseman). Legislative Studies Quarterly, 30 (2005): 497-505.
Parties in the Electorate, Parties in Government, and Partisan Bias (with Adam Meirowitz and Thomas Romer). Political Analysis, 13 (2005): 113-38.
Testing Theories of Lawmaking (with Adam Meirowitz and Jonathan Woon). In Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks, eds. David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, Berlin: Springer (pp. 249-268, 2005).
Legislative Organization. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18 (2004): 113-28.
Boxing Methods in Legislative Studies. The Evolution of Political Knowledge: Theory and Inquiry in American Politics. Edward Mansfield and Richard Sisson, eds. Columbus Ohio: Ohio State University Press. 2004: 195-99.
Institutionalism as a Methodology (with Daniel Diermeier). Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15 (2003): 123-44.
The Coefficient of Party Influence. Political Analysis, 11 (2003): 96-104.
Asymmetry in Party Influence: Reply. Political Analysis, 11 (2003): 109-10.
Minority Rights and Majority Power: Theoretical Consequences of the Motion to Recommit (with Adam Meirowitz). Legislative Studies Quarterly, 27 (2002): 191-218.
Here’s the President, Where’s the Party? U.S. Appropriations on Discretionary Domestic Spending, 1950-1999 (with Rod Kiewiet, in Japanese). Leviathan, 30 (2002): 115-37, 2001.
Joseph G. Cannon: Majoritarian from Illinois (with Alan Wiseman). Legislative Studies Quarterly, 26 (2001): 357-389.
Plausibility of Signals by Heterogeneous Committees. American Political Science Review, 95 (2001): 453-8.
Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship. American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000): 212-27.
The Party Effect from A to Z and Beyond. Journal of Politics, 61 (1999): 832-40.
Paradoxes of Parties in Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999): 31-64.
Pivotal Politics: A Refinement of Nonmarket Analysis for Voting Institutions. Business and Politics, 1 (1999): 63:81.
Specialization Decisions within Committee (with Thomas Gilligan). Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 13 (1997): 366-86.
Restrictive Rules Reconsidered. American Journal of Political Science, 41(1997): 919-44.
Rejoinder to “Sense and Sensability”. American Journal of Political Science, 1 (1997): 958-64.
Dynamics of Cosponsorship (with Daniel Kessler). American Political Science Review, 90 (1996): 1-12.
Committee Power, Leadership, and the Median Voter: Evidence from the Smoking Ban. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 12 (1996): 234-56.
Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 8 (1996): 7-40.
Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z. American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995): 906-23.
The Gains from Exchange Hypothesis of Legislative Organization (with Thomas Gilligan). Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19: (1994) 181-214.
Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102nd Congress. (with Timothy Groseclose). American Journal of Political Science, 38: 75-99 (1994).
Deference, Extremism, and Interest Group Ratings. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19: 61-78 (1994).
Where’s the Party? British Journal of Political Science, 23: (1993) 235-66.
The Pervasiveness of Sophisticated Sincerity (with Timothy Groseclose). Political Economy: Institutions, Information, Competition and Representation. W. Barnett, M. Hinich, H. Rosenthal, and N.Schofield, eds., New York: Cambridge University Press, (1993) 247-78.
Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences. Public Choice, 76: (1993) 21-37.
Seniority, Commitment, and Self-Governing Groups. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 6: (1990) 73-77.
Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers? American Political Science Review, 84 (1990): 149-63.
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature. (with Thomas Gilligan), American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990): 531-64.
Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration. (with Douglas Rivers), Journal of Politics, 52 (1990): 548-78.
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee. (with Thomas Gilligan), American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989): 459-90.
Collective Choice without Procedural Commitment. (with Thomas Gilligan). Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, Peter C. Ordeshook, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1989).
A Rationale for Restrictive Rules. Home Style and Washington Work, Morris P. Fiorina and David W. Rohde, eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1989).
The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage. (with Douglas Rivers), American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988): 1151-74.
Spatial Models of Legislative Choice. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 8 (1988): 259-319.
Complex Rules and Congressional Outcomes: An Event Study of Energy Tax Legislation. (with Thomas Gilligan) Journal of Politics 50 (1988): 625-54.
Why Are Congressional Committees Powerful? American Political Science Review, 81 (1987): 929-35.
Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures. (with Thomas Gilligan) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (1987): 287-335.
The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget. (with John Ferejohn) American Journal of Political Science, 31 (1987): 296-320.
Sophisticated Committees and Structure-Induced Equilibria in Congress. Congress: Structure and Policy. Mathew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press (1987).
Sophisticated and Myopic Behavior in Legislative Committees: An Experimental Study. American Journal of Political Science 30 (1986): 542-61.
Unanimous Consent Agreements: Going Along in the Senate. Journal of Politics, 48 (1986): 306-329.
A Technique for Estimating Congressmen’s Ideal Points. Journal of Politics, 48 (1986): 97-115.
Obstruction and Representativeness in Legislatures. American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985): 643-59.
The Quality of Survey Responses about Parents and Families: A Longitudinal Analysis. (with Richard Niemi), Political Methodology, 10 (1984): 193-209.
The Incumbency Advantage in Congressional Elections: A Test of Two Explanations. (with John Wright), American Journal of Political Science, 27 (1983): 140-57.