Reading List

Note: this reading list will be updated throughout the semester so check back prior to each lecture. Reading assignments will be posted separately. Not all of these readings will be assigned for class; many are background or are advanced reading for the interested student.

Part I: Auctions

I.AAuction Theory

I.A.1Single Unit Auctions

I.A.1Multi-Unit Auctions

I.B Designing Auction Markets: Applications

I.B.1 Timber

I.B.2 Spectrum

I.B.3 Airport Landing Slots

I.B.4 Electricity

I.B.5 Pollution Permits

  • Cramton, Peter andSuzi Kerr. 2002. “Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather.” Energy Policy, 30, 333-345.
  • Ellerman, A.Denny, Richard Schmalensee, Paul L. Joskow, Juan Pablo Montero, and Elizabeth M. Brady. DATE? “Emissions Trading Under the U.S.Acid Rain Program: Evaluation of Compliance Costs and Allowance Market Performance.” Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

I.B.6 Treasury Bills

  • Bikhchandani, Sushil and Chi-Fu Huang. 1993. “The Economics of Treasury Securities Markets.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), 117-134.
  • Malvey, Paul F., Christina M. Archibald, and Sean T. Flynn. 1998. “Uniform-Price Auctions: Evaluation of the Treasury Experience.”
  • Malvey, Paul F., Christina M. Archibald. 1998. “Uniform-Price Auctions: Update of the Treasury Experience.” Office of Market Finance, U.S. Treasury.

I.B.7 Bus Routes and Combinatorial Auctions

I.C Online Auctions

I.C.1 eBay

I.C.2 Online Auctions: Auctions for Sponsored Links

Part II: Two-Sided Markets

  • Ambrus, Atilla and Rosella Argenziano. 2009. “Asymmetric Networks in Two- sided Markets.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1(1): 17-52.
  • Armstrong, Mark. 2006. “Competition in Two-Sided Markets.” RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), 668-691.
  • Armstrong, Mark and Julian Wright. 2006. “Two-Sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks, and Exclusive Contracts.” Economic Theory, 32(2), 353-380.
  • Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien. 2003. “Chicken and Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers.” RAND Journal of Economics, 34(2), 309-328.
  • Ellison, Glen, Drew Fudenberg, and Markus Mobius. 2004. “Competing Auctions.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(1), 30-66.
  • Evans, David S. 2003. “The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets.” Yale Journal on Regulation, 20, 325-382.
  • Hagiu, Andrei. 2006. “Pricing and Commitment by Two-Sided Platforms.” RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), 720-737.

II.A Dating Markets

  • Fisman, Raymond, Sheena Iyengar, Emir Kamenica, and Itamar Simonson. 2006. “Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence from a Speed Dating Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), 673-697.
  • Fisman, Raymond, Sheena S. Iyengar, Emir Kamenica, Itamar Simonson. 2005. “Searching For a Mate: Evidence From a Speed Dating Experiment.” Working Paper, Columbia University.
  • Fisman, Raymond, Sheena Iyengar, Emir Kamenica, & Itamar Simonson. DATE? “Racial Preferences in Dating.” Review of Economic Studies, 2007, forthcoming.
  • Hortacsu, Ali, Guenter Hitsch and Dan Ariely. 2006. “What Makes You Click?Mate Preferences and Matching Outcomes in Online Dating.” MIT Sloan Research Paper #4603-06. Link to Hal Varian’s NY Times column on this paper.

II.B Media Markets

  • Anderson, Simon and Stephen Coate. 2005. “Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis.” Review of Economic Studies, 72(253), 947-952.

Part III: Matching Markets

III.A Introduction and Theory

  • Gale, David and Lloyd Shapley. 1962. “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage.” American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15.
  • Roth, Alvin E. 2002. “The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation as Tools of Design Economics.” Econometrica, 70(4), 1341-1378.
  • Roth, Alvin E. and M. Sotomayor. 1990. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge University Press (Chapters 2-4).
  • Roth, Alvin E. 1984. “The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study inGame Theory.” Journal of Political Economy, 92, 991-1016.

III.B Labor Markets

III.B.1 National Resident Matching Program

  • Bulow, Jeremy and Jonathan D. Levin. 2006. “Matching and Price Competition.” American Economic Review, 96(3), 652-658.
  • Frechette, Guillaume, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. 2007. “Unraveling Yields InefficientMatchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls,” The RAND journal of economics, 38(4), 967-982.
  • Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth, 2003. “Unraveling Reduces the Scope of an Entry Level Labor Market: Gastroenterology With and Without a Centralized Match.” Journal of Political Economy, 111(6), 1342-1352.
  • Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth, “Relationship Between Wages and Presence of a Match in Medical Fellowships,” JAMA, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 290, No. 9, September 3, 2003, 1153-1154.
  • Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth, “Effect of a Match on Salaries for Medical Fellows’ Reply,” JAMA, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 290, No. 18, November 12, 2003, 2408.
  • Niederle, Muriel, Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts, forthcoming, American Economic Review.
  • Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 1992, paperback ed. Chapter 5.
  • Roth, Alvin E. and Elliott Peranson. 1999. “The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design.” American Economic Review, 89(4), 748-780.
  • Roth, Alvin E. and Xiaolin Xing. 1994. “Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions.” American Economic Review, 84, 992-1044.
  • Roth, Alvin E. 1991. “A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K.” American Economic Review, 81(3), 415-440.
  • Roth, Alvin E. 1990. “New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization.” Science, 250, 1524-1528.

III.B.2 Law Clerks

  • Avery, Christopher, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth. 2001. “The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks.” University of Chicago Law Review, 68(3), Summer, 793-902.
  • Haruvy, Ernan, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. 2006. “The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 30(3), 457-486.

III.CSchool Choice

  • Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. 2006. “Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match.” Harvard University.
  • Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez. 2006. “Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism.” Working Paper, Boston College.
  • Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. 2005. “The New York City High School Match.” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95(2), 364-367.
  • Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, and Tayfun Sonmez. “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach.” 2003. American Economic Review93-3: 729-747, June.
  • Erdil, Aytek and Haluk Ergin. What’s the matter with tie-breaking? (Improving efficiency in school choice), forthcoming, AER.

III.D Kidney Exchange

Part IV: Markets for Health Care Insurance

IV. A Theory

  • Cutler, David M. and Richard Zeckhauser. 1999. “The Anatomy of Health Insurance.” NBER Working Paper7176. Also published in The Handbook of Health Economics. Culter and Newhouse, eds. Elsevier. 2000.
  • Cutler, David M. and Sarah J. Reber. 1998. “Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-off Between Competition and Adverse Selection.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2), May, 433-466.
  • Newhouse, Joseph P. 1996. “Reimbursing Health Plans and Providers: Efficiency in Production Versus Selection.”  Journal of Economic Literature.

IV.B Hospital Networks and Insurance

  • Ho, Katherine. 2007. “Insurer-Provider Networks in the Medical Care Market.” Working Paper, Columbia University.
  • Ho, Katherine. 2006. “The Welfare Effects of Restricted Hospital Choice in the U.S. Medical Care Market.” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21(7), 1039-1079.

IV.C Information Provision

Part V: Market Design Resources on the Internet

V.A Web Sites with Additional Information

Al Roth’s market design page

Bob Wilson’s Market Design Class at Stanford GSB

David Parkes teaches a class on market design from a computer science perspective at Harvard

Peter Cramton’s market design class at Maryland

V.B Project Ideas

Ideas from Al Roth’s Course

Ideas from Peter Cramton’s course