Time and Place: Friday, 1 p.m. – 4 p.m., Littauer M-15

The Class Will Not Meet: 9/28

Class Format: The class will be a mix of lectures and student presentations

Class Requirements: The main class requirement will be a term paper. The paper will be a critical literature review of a particular topic, together with a proposal for a research project in that area. The secondary requirement will be a student presentation in class.

Reading List: Download the reading list. Only a subset of papers will be covered.

Preliminary Schedule:

DateTopicReading (see reading list for more sources)
9/21Static mechanism designMas-Collel, Whinston, and Green, Chp. 23
10/5Static mechanism design, Common value auctionsMilgrom, P. and R. Weber, “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,” Econometrica, 1982, 50, 1089-1122.
10/12-10/19Repeated Games: Tools and MethodsAbreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti, “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometrica v58, n5 (September 1990): 1041-63.
Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin, “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,” Econometrica v62, n5 (September 1994): 997-1039.
10/26Games with Transfers; Dynamic GamesDavid Miller, “Attainable Payoffs in Repeated Games with Interdependent Private Valuations
Athey, S. and I. Segal, “An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
11/2Relational Contracts and Trading GamesLevin, J., Relational Incentive Contracts
Athey, S. and D. Miller, Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuationsTheoretical Economics, 2 (2007), 299-354.

Athey, S. and K. Bagwell, “Optimal Collusion with Private Information.” RAND Journal of Economics, Autumn 2001.
Athey, S., K. Bagwell, and C. Sanchirico, “Collusion and Price Rigidity.” REStud, 2004.

Athey, S. and K. Bagwell, “Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks” forthcoming,Econometrica.

9/21: Static mechanism design.Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, Chapter 23.