Time and Place: Friday, 1 p.m. – 4 p.m., Littauer M-15
The Class Will Not Meet: 9/28
Class Format: The class will be a mix of lectures and student presentations
Class Requirements: The main class requirement will be a term paper. The paper will be a critical literature review of a particular topic, together with a proposal for a research project in that area. The secondary requirement will be a student presentation in class.
Reading List: Download the reading list. Only a subset of papers will be covered.
|Date||Topic||Reading (see reading list for more sources)|
|9/21||Static mechanism design||Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green, Chp. 23|
|10/5||Static mechanism design, Common value auctions||Milgrom, P. and R. Weber, “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,” Econometrica, 1982, 50, 1089-1122.|
|10/12-10/19||Repeated Games: Tools and Methods||Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti, “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometrica v58, n5 (September 1990): 1041-63.|
Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin, “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,” Econometrica v62, n5 (September 1994): 997-1039.
|10/26||Games with Transfers; Dynamic Games||David Miller, “Attainable Payoffs in Repeated Games with Interdependent Private Valuations”|
Athey, S. and I. Segal, “An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism”
|11/2||Relational Contracts and Trading Games||Levin, J., Relational Incentive Contracts|
Athey, S. and D. Miller, Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations, Theoretical Economics, 2 (2007), 299-354.
Athey, S. and K. Bagwell, “Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks” forthcoming,Econometrica.
9/21: Static mechanism design.Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, Chapter 23.