Time and Place: Friday, 1 p.m. – 4 p.m., Littauer M-15
The Class Will Not Meet: 9/28
Class Format: The class will be a mix of lectures and student presentations
Class Requirements: The main class requirement will be a term paper. The paper will be a critical literature review of a particular topic, together with a proposal for a research project in that area. The secondary requirement will be a student presentation in class.
Reading List: Download the reading list. Only a subset of papers will be covered.
Preliminary Schedule:
Date | Topic | Reading (see reading list for more sources) |
9/21 | Static mechanism design | Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green, Chp. 23 |
10/5 | Static mechanism design, Common value auctions | Milgrom, P. and R. Weber, “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,” Econometrica, 1982, 50, 1089-1122. |
10/12-10/19 | Repeated Games: Tools and Methods | Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti, “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometrica v58, n5 (September 1990): 1041-63. Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin, “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,” Econometrica v62, n5 (September 1994): 997-1039. |
10/26 | Games with Transfers; Dynamic Games | David Miller, “Attainable Payoffs in Repeated Games with Interdependent Private Valuations” Athey, S. and I. Segal, “An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism” |
11/2 | Relational Contracts and Trading Games | Levin, J., Relational Incentive Contracts Athey, S. and D. Miller, Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations, Theoretical Economics, 2 (2007), 299-354. |
11/9 | Collusion | Athey, S. and K. Bagwell, “Optimal Collusion with Private Information.” RAND Journal of Economics, Autumn 2001. Athey, S. and K. Bagwell, “Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks” forthcoming,Econometrica. |
9/21: Static mechanism design.Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, Chapter 23.