I study the interaction of politics and markets. My research examines how political institutions shape market structures and how market structures, in turn, shape firms’ political influence. I seek to understand how the political and economic systems work together, and how to design institutions that improve outcomes in both domains. I address questions such as: How does the design and operation of political institutions shape market outcomes? How does the structure of market competition affect political influence and policy outcomes? How do markets shape who enters into politics and how they impact policymaking?
The Dynamics of a Policy Outcome: Market Response and Bureaucratic Enforcement of a Policy Change, with Steve Callander and Takuo Sugaya. American Journal of Political Science, accepted.
Market Competition and Political Influence: An Integrated Approach, with Steve Callander and Takuo Sugaya, Econometrica, 2022.
How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability, American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming.
The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information, with Vladimir Asriyan and Victoria Vanasco, AEJ: Microeconomics, forthcoming.
The Management of Talent: Optimal Contracting for Selection and Incentives, with Takuo Sugaya, The RAND Journal of Economics, 2021.
Value for Money? Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability, with Jessica Leight, Rohini Pande, Laura Ralston, Journal of Public Economics, 2020.
The Common Determinants of Legislative and Regulatory Complexity, with Massimo Morelli. September 2022. (updates and replaces the 2021 working paper Complexity and the Reform Process )
- PhD, Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 2014
- BA, Economics & Mathematics, Amherst College, 2009
Fellowships, Honors and Awards
- John A. Gunn & Cynthia Fry Gunn Faculty Scholar, Stanford GSB, 2015-2016
- MIT Presidential Fellowship, 2009-2011
- Rufus B. Kellogg University Fellowship, 2009-2012
- Phi Beta Kappa, Amherst College, 2009